Difference between revisions of "XMPP E2E Security"

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== XEP-0384: OMEMO Encryption (Signal / Text Secure) ==
== XEP-0384: OMEMO Encryption (Signal / Text Secure) ==


'''Recommendation:''' Implement.
'''Recommendation:''' Implement if you need forward secrecy.


OMEMO is based on the Signal double ratchet and provides forward secrecy, compatibility with history retrieval for devices that are already part of the ratchet, and a number of other benefits over legacy encryption mechanisms. It has had an independent third party audit (see related links at bottom).
OMEMO is based on the Signal double ratchet and provides forward secrecy, compatibility with history retrieval for devices that are already part of the ratchet, and a number of other benefits over legacy encryption mechanisms. It has had an independent third party audit (see related links at bottom).
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'''Recommendation:''' Exploratory implementations are encouraged.
'''Recommendation:''' Exploratory implementations are encouraged.


The OpenPGP for XMPP (OX) specification currently consists of a baseline specification: [https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0373.html XEP-0373] and a profile for Instant Messaging specification [https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0374.html XEP-0374]. It is under active development and thus subject to change although can be considered pretty stable for the major parts.
The OpenPGP for XMPP (OX) specification currently consists of a baseline specification: [https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0373.html XEP-0373] and a profile for Instant Messaging specification [https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0374.html XEP-0374]. It is under active development and thus subject to change although can be considered pretty stable regarding most parts.


OX attempts to fix the various security design flaws of XEP-0027, and additionally specifies features like "arbitrary extension element" verification and protection.
OX attempts to fix the various security design flaws of XEP-0027, and additionally specifies features like "arbitrary extension element" verification and protection.


Implementations are available for Gajim and Smack.
Implementations are available for Gajim and Smack, and have been successfully tested against each other for interoperability.


== XEP-0027 (legacy PGP) ==
== XEP-0027 (Legacy OpenPGP) ==


'''Recommendation:''' do not implement unless compatibility with legacy clients is required.
'''Recommendation:''' Do '''not implement''', as the specification has [https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0027.html#security serious security issues].


One of the first proposals for end-to-end security is based on [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy PGP] and described in [http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0027.html XEP-0027].
One of the first proposals for end-to-end security is based on [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy PGP] and described in [http://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0027.html XEP-0027].
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= Discussion =
= Discussion =
If you have any questions or comments regarding this page, please [xmpp:xsf@muc.xmpp.org?join join the XSF chatroom at xsf@muc.xmpp.org].
If you have any questions or comments regarding this page, please [xmpp:xsf@muc.xmpp.org?join join the XSF chatroom at xsf@muc.xmpp.org].
= Abandoned and Legacy E2EE specifications =
Those specifications are very likely not relevant any more. They either gained no adoption or where replaced in favor of newer specifications. They are listed here only for the sake of completeness.
== draft-miller-xmpp-e2e ==
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-miller-xmpp-e2e/
== ESessions ==
https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0187.html
https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0188.html
== RFC 3923: End-to-End Signing and Object Encryption for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) ==
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3923
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